3rd July 2003
Lord Justice Simon Brown
Queen’s Bench Division
Royal Courts of Justice
Dear Lord Brown,
After correspondence with Court officials and the Police I am given to understand that no investigation into serious breaches of Court rules can be instigated unless the presiding judges specifically request such an investigation.
In that correspondence I requested directions in respect to investigations into perjury, contempt of court, perversion of the course of justice and gross deception which has resulted in enormous unnecessary expense to the tax-payer.
My case of simple employer negligence and breaches of statutory duty was forced against my will, seemingly by Government decree, into the group Sheep Dip litigation under the name of Herbert George Snell and others - v – Robert Young & Co Ltd and others .
My case did not involve Sheep Dip but it was entrapped by the Practice Direction (Queen's Bench Division: Organophosphate Litigation) reported on 31 December 1998
“Directions given for future conduct of all personal injury cases alleging damage caused through use of organophosphates in sheep dips. Cases to be commenced in central office Queen's Bench Division, and existing cases transferred there, for Master Miller.”
All my protests were ignored and the case, which was on the way to trial, was stalled completely.
There appears to have been serious general conflict of interest since the Government was reported as a co-defendant in the multiple party action, and the Court acts for the Government.
Perhaps as important was the apparent admission by Mr Justice Morland that he actually had shares in two of the chemical companies which would have benefited from the failure of the action against their products.
Due to my concern about the conduct of the case by those supposedly representing my best interests in the court process I wrote to both Master Miller and Mr Justice Morland expressing my concerns and offering supporting evidence which was being withheld from the court.
Despite being thanked and informed that I was right to draw the Judges’ attention to these issues not only was no action taken but my case was singled out by the judges for special mention and denied the right of appeal.
As a result I have been denied my right to Natural Justice.
There is concern that in the UK we have no Article 13 under the Human Rights Act and that this may prevent subjects from obtaining Natural Justice but it is my view that had the Judges acted correctly in this matter the Court would have been able to achieve the correct judgement.
In Pinochet Ugarte Reported 18 January 1999 states “Where a judge in a case had a clear connection with a party in a case, he had to declare that interest and accept disqualification”
I understand that the defence prepared Mr Justice Morland’s final judgement on the case and if that is the fact it is cause for real concern, given his declared share interests.
In the case of Flannery and Another -v- Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd, Trading As Colleys Professional Services reported as 04 March 1999 it was stated that ”a judge at first instance taking a view on an experts report should give reasons in his judgement for that view. On appeal where no reasons had been given he should be asked to provide reasons by affidavit for the appeal.”
I have repeatedly asked those who should have represented my case in court for copies of the evidence presented to the Judges and since those requests have been refused, and I do not have copies of the court transcripts, I do not have the full reasons given for the striking out of my case.
I would be grateful then if you could arrange for affidavits from Lord Justice Morland and Master Miller in which they should explain their reasons for both the striking out of my case and why they took no action on the reporting of the offences mentioned earlier in this letter.
I understand that transcripts for the various hearings are available and I request copies of same to be provided to me at the public’s expense, since my case also concerned the safe use of pesticides in food production and therefore concerned protecting the health of the public.
I believe that there have been serious breaches of court rules in this matter and that similar breaches have occurred in other cases, both within this action and in unrelated actions.
I also believe that criminal actions have taken place in the attempts to prevent these cases receiving fair hearings and due remedy within the justice system of this country.
I seek your directions on the above matters and draw your attention to the following case law.
Please reply enclosing the requested documentation
Errington -v- Wilson (Scotland) reported 02 June 1995 - The cross examination of an expert must be allowed when his report had not been accepted by the opposing party.
Clearly the defence experts in my case placed false in formation before the court and challenge in a court of law should have been permitted..
Arrow Nominees Inc, Lorraine Blackledge -v- Graham Blackledge, Margaret Blackledge, GR MM Blackledge Reported 02 November 1999 Hon. Mr. Justice Evans-Lombe - Where a party was in breach of court rules, even in contumacious breach, or in the case of conduct which might amount to fraud, that was not itself sufficient to justify a striking out of a party's case. The right to a fair trial was paramount.
With knowledge of such breaches why did the judges allow my case to be struck out?
Director General of Fair Trading -v- Pioneer Concrete (Uk) Ltd reported 30 November 1994 - An employee who was in contempt of court, when acting within the scope of his employment, made the company for whom he worked also in contempt.
Experts and others who placed false evidence before the court, often under, or assumed to be under, Statements of Truth were in contempt – as were those who permitted such actions.
Attorney General -v- Independent Television News and Others Reported 12 May 1994 - Contempt of court defeated by deal in trial reducing risk of prejudice
Does this explain the reluctance to pursue these matters? Was a “deal done”?
Malgar Ltd -v- R E Leach Engineering Ltd Reported 17 February 2000 - The new Civil Procedure Rules, could not change the substantive law. Accordingly no new category of contempt could be introduced with respect to statements of truth made without being verified. The policing of statements of truth had to be subject to the same over-riding objectives as applied to other part of the litigation process, and proceedings for contempt should only be brought with the permission of the court or the Attorney-General.
What are the objectives of Statements of Truth if they mean nothing in proceedings?
Bokharia -v- Blessed Reported 16 January 1995 - The laws of contempt of court apply just as much in arbitration proceedings in chambers as in other proceedings.
Presumably this also includes pre-trial hearings?
Connolly -v- Dale Reported 13 July 1995 - It was a contempt for a police inspector to prevent defence solicitors from completing their proper enquiries.
Was it therefore contempt for the refusal to release, or allow full access to, vital supporting evidence to the plaintiffs by both the defendants, the National Health Service, and others?
Attorney-General -v- Newspaper Publishing Plc and Others Reported 02 May 1997 - A third party was in contempt of court if the proceedings had been significantly, and adversely, affected. It was not necessary that they had been frustrated entirely.
Clearly the proceedings were adversely affected by the reported actions and the case was frustrated by them to the point where the defendants struck out the entire action and all those which were to follow. This gave advantage to the defence to the detriment of future cases.
Bird -v- Hadkinson Reported 07 April 1999 - A party ordered to make disclosure in Mareva proceedings, could be found in contempt where the answers given were technically true, but misleading because of their incompleteness. The party has a clear duty to provide full and accurate disclosure.
This must surely also apply to Statements made in Particulars of Fact and other vital matters.
Khan -v- Armaguard Ltd Reported 04 March 1994 - Full disclosure not to be ordered only in rare cases in personal injury claims.
It seems that application for full disclosure by the defence was denied by Mr Justice Morland. Please clarify the true position.
Curi -v- Colina Reported 14 October 1998 - Chance of 'serious … disease or deterioration' must be measurable risk rather than merely fanciful. There must be a possibility of deterioration, but there is no need to show more than a possibility.
It is clear that the long term health risk to all those in the group OP action was known and has been recognised by Act of Parliament since 1958. Why was the court not informed?
Black -v- Braer Corporation and Others Reported 12 October 1998 - A person claiming under the Act was able to claim not only for physical damages suffered as a result of breach of the Act but also for psychological harm suffered. Wrong to limit damage to physical harm once liability admitted for personal injury.
This was under the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 1, 12 and raises similar issues as in the OP litigation, given the use of hydrocarbons in the formulations.
Casey -v- Morane Ltd Reported 10 May 2000 - An employee suffered injuries at work for which he was adjudged 15% responsible and the company 85%. Because of the accident he was demoted and suffered loss of earnings. He claimed that loss of earnings in his action for damages. The court found that the company should pay the damages. The company was itself predominantly responsible for the damage caused, and these losses flowed directly from the accident.
In my case the use of an illegal mixture of chemicals was admitted in statements made to the court by the defence. I could not be found contributory negligent due to the failure to notify of the nature of the released chemical and yet my case was barred from Court. Why?
Hipwood -v- Gloucester Health Authority and Others Reported 21 February 1995 - Plaintiff claiming personal injuries damages is entitled to see his GPs medical records.
Interestingly the defence had open access to my records but they were withheld from me both directly and via the legal teams. Attempts to have them protected have been made but the results of that action are uncertain and such steps should not have been necessary.
Edwards -v- Peter Black Healthcare (Southern) Limited Reported 27 May 1999 - A defendant in a personal injury case, who asserted that the plaintiff's injuries as described in the claim form did not fit those described by the plaintiff's medical expert, must accept the onus of proving that point.”
The defence escaped from this duty by supplying misleading information.
Plumb -v- Ayres Reported 11 May 1999 - Appeals in personal injury cases against a judge's finding on liability are very unlikely to succeed, and in future, leave to appeal should only be given where there is a clear evidence that the judge had made an error of principle.
I believe that the judges did indeed make errors of principle.
Myers -v- Dortex International Ltd Reported 18 March 1999 - Where a defendant claimed for damages following two accidents and the second insurers wished to apportion the damages, it was wrong to join the first since this faced the plaintiff with two causation defences. The judges decision should allow explanation.
In being forced into the Sheep Dip group I then faced the combined forces of the sheep dip manufacturers when in fact they were not defendants as the employer had abused the chemicals.
In addition the judges overlooked the “Fragile Egg” scenario implicit in my case and the additional dangers presented by the illegal mixture of pesticides as admitted by the defence.
Hill v Tomkins 1997 Mrs Justice Smith on 17th July 1997 declared that “There can be no excuse for the non-production of a hospital record” and further that what was required was “the initial notes and the original recording of data rather than transcription of it”
All efforts to obtain full copies of my medical records were blocked by government agencies.
Lawyers even claimed that some hospitals denied that I had attended, despite billing the tax-payer for that attendance and for reports. Defence evidence in that case also strengthens my own.
27th November 2003
Lord Justice Simon Brown
Queen’s Bench Division
Royal Courts of Justice
Dear Lord Justice Brown,
I refer you to the full content of my letter dated 19th November to which this is a supplement.
Phillip Morris replied on your behalf, suggesting that your involvement with the case had ended.
With due respect it seems to me that this is not strictly true since your task is to uphold the law and to ensure that cases for which you were responsible were conducted lawfully and in the spirit of the law. Decisions taken during the pre-trial hearings on this case have caused much grief and distress to the innocent plaintiffs and brought comfort and joy to those whose actions have sullied the good name of the legal system which purports to act for this nation under the rule of God.
In fact there have been numerous instances when unlawful actions have come to light many years after a case has been decided in court and investigation has been ordered.
The recent case involving Lord Archer is just one such incident.
The purpose of my letter was to ensure that you were aware of the unlawful actions in my case.
I understand that you have a duty to the court to ensure that the Law is enforced and Justice done.
In fact concealment of a crime is itself a criminal offence and if the court fails to act it will be seen as condoning crime and failing to uphold the rule of law.
Failure to take action when criminal offences are reported makes the person who failed to perform his/her legal duty also a party to the offence, as you will be aware.
Perjury, as you will know, is an offence against the state, as are most criminal actions.
The decision to strike out the case was based on false and incomplete information, and the judges involved were aware of that fact. That decision was therefore unlawful and it also assisted the concealment of perjury and perversion of the course of justice by protecting the defence from the lawful and rightful challenge of false evidence provided to the court.
Although expert witnesses are said to be immune from prosecution other witnesses relied upon by the defence, upon whom those experts relied, are not immune. All are expected to assist the court to reach a just conclusion and to be truthful and independent of either party.
It would appear that some orders of the court actually precluded a successful outcome.
“Impartiality is reinforced by the Practice Direction accompanying part 35 of the CPR and by most judgments involving alleged partisanship of expert witnesses” but the reality was opposite.
The court refused to investigate those reported criminal acts and as a direct result the cases in the group action were struck out. I understand that the case files are currently before the court for costing and that this is despite my protests regarding misappropriation and misuse of public funds and the failure to properly represent and conduct the cases through the court.
“It is an offence knowingly to carry out any act with intent to impede the apprehension or prosecution of a person known guilty of a arrestable offence.”
I am reliably informed by various legal organisations that the matters reported are a matter for the Police but the Police refuse to act, on cost grounds, unless instructed to do so by the Courts.
There were also a number of administrative and procedural errors.
Initially the group was intended to be for Organophosphorus Sheep Dip cases only, but the group was weakened, probably intentionally, by the inclusion of a variety of cases, such as my own, which had no links or relationship with Sheep Dip chemicals.
Furthermore, each case was instructed by the court to prove that all the harm done to them was caused by the active ingredients, despite the known enhancing and toxic effects of the co-formulants, and in my own case the unknown effects of an illegal mixture, the nature of which the experts must by law have been informed about but failed to mention in their reports.
In February 1996 Lord Justice Staughton said that the court “was prima facie entitled to every man’s evidence whether of fact or opinion” and that “the court should know whether the expert had some connection with the case in question”.
The document “Response to the criminal justice white paper - Justice for All” as approved by the Bar Council on 12 October 2002 comments “Para 3.62 is set out in the following terms:
"The Government also intends to review existing court powers to order defendants to pay prosecution costs where they have failed to give legal representatives instructions or to meet defence disclosure obligations. As well as the power to penalise lawyers by making them pay costs wasted as a result of their errors or omissions, we will also consider whether other forms of penalties, including financial, could be applied."
According to the BBC broadcast in March 2003 the cost to the plaintiffs in this matter is reported to be £5 million and the costs to the defence, which are also likely to be met by the tax payer, reported to be a staggering £35 million. The public costs due to the failure to proceed with these cases in accordance with the rule of law will be enormous and could have been avoided.
There are “existing powers to order wasted costs in appropriate circumstances. This is a procedure, which, since its inception in 1990, has been both tried and tested. It has proved to be a sanction that is both practical and workable. The wasted costs order is a serious measure which, at all times, hangs over the head of the solicitor and barrister practitioner alike.”
The Court must ensure that such measures are utilised to protect the public purse. In this case the wasted costs appear to be the result of an extraordinary collusion by all involved against the interests of the plaintiffs by which the Civil Procedure Rules were not enforced and the plaintiffs’ options were limited by instructions from the Legal Services Commission and the Judges’ orders.
In my case there is written evidence that proves perversion of the course of justice and contempt of court by staff members of the Health & Safety Executive, the Medical Toxicology Unit, formerly known as the National Poisons Unit, the Guy’s & St Thomas NHS Trust, and the Benefits Agency -all of which are direct employees of the Government, a group co-defendant.
Those crimes were the direct result of false statements given to the HSE, and to the Court, by two members of the defendant’s staff, likely as not in fear of losing their employment and houses.
The influence of the insurers, who are the actual beneficiaries of the crimes, is also evident.
However, all involved were informed at relevant times but refused to correct their mistakes.
It is clear that the HSE staff intended to halt the court action and to overturn the diagnosis of the hospital by providing false information. That action also corrupted the Benefits Agency work.
It is also apparent that the judges showed bias in favour of the most powerful industry in the world to the detriment of the plaintiffs and their right to due remedy and justice.
I reported to you, and to the court and other authorities, offences that have brought the legal system, and the High Court itself, into disrepute. If you choose to ignore that information then at least I have done my duty and have complied with the instructions of the Police and others who suggest that they can only proceed with an investigation under orders from the court.
Your duty is to ensure that Court proceedings are lawful and to ensure that justice is seen to be done. I believe you also have a duty to act when criminal actions are reported, especially when those actions have resulted in enormous cost to the taxpayer and denial of remedy for the injured.
Quote “Penalty for concealing offence…Where a person has committed an arrestable offence, any other person who, knowing or believing that the offence or some other arrestable offence has been committed and that he or she has information which might be of material assistance in securing the prosecution or conviction of an offender for it, accepts or agrees to accept for not disclosing that information any consideration other than the making good of loss or injury caused by the offence, or the making of reasonable compensation for that loss or injury, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years”
“Penalties for assisting offenders…Any person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an indictable offence shall be liable to be indicted, tried and punished as a principal offender - Where a person has committed an arrestable offence, any other person who, knowing or believing him or her to be guilty of the offence or of some other arrestable offence, does without reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his or her apprehension or prosecution shall be guilty of an offence.” - Offences under sections 7 and 8 of the Criminal Law Act, 1997.
I understand the complexity and international aspects of these cases but in essence my case was prejudiced and made more complex by dishonesty and its incorporation into the group litigation.
I should add at this point that I am officially regarded as disabled for life and that the cause of that disability is officially recognised as the incident that triggered this “simple” negligence case.
This is further evidence to show that the court grossly mishandled this case and denied remedy.
In the House of Commons on 21 July 1999 Mr. Denzil Davies (Llanelli) suggested that
“Essentially, the criminal justice system is already dominated by the state. In effect, all crimes are crimes against the state. The prosecutor is the state and, with the development of the Crown Prosecution Service--to which I do not object, and which appears to be putting its house in order--prosecution advocates will increasingly be employees of the state. Judges, who are the salt of the earth, are, ultimately, employees of the state.”
When we hide corruption we become corrupt and that perfectly explains the unholy mess that has become the Organophosphorus litigation in general and my case in particular. I am sure that you would not approve of Judges who assist those who poison the earth and its people – literally.
I look forward to your response and to a full investigation into the conduct of this matter.
If you are unable to take action please inform those who can or give me the contact information.
Please carefully examine the following, with my last letter, and their significance in the above.
Contempt of Court Act 1981
Criminal Law Act 1977
Health and Safety at Work Etc Act 1974
Data Protection Act 1998
Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906
Criminal Attempts Act 1981, ss 2(1) and 2(2)(a), the former of which provides that any provision to which the section applies shall have effect with respect to an offence under s 1 of attempting to commit an offence as it has effect with respect to the offence committed, and the latter of which expressly provides that any consent provisions in those offences apply equally to attempts.
Bird -v- Hadkinson reported 7th April 1999 Contempt of Court - A party ordered to make disclosure could be found in contempt where the answers given were technically true, but misleading because of their incompleteness. The party has a clear duty to provide full and accurate disclosure.
Attorney-General -v- Newspaper Publishing Plc and Others reported 2nd May 1997
Contempt of Court - A third party was in contempt of court if the proceedings had been significantly, and adversely, affected. It was not necessary that they had been frustrated entirely.
Bokharia -v- Blessed reported 16th January 1995 Contempt of Court - The laws of contempt of court apply just as much in arbitration proceedings in chambers as in other proceedings.
Acrow (Automation) Ltd -v- Rex Chainbelt Inc reported 1st January 1971
Contempt of Court - A person not party to proceedings, but who knows of an order made in them, and assists in its breach or nullifies the purpose of a trial may be liable for contempt.