The Parliamentary Ombudsman and Misconduct by Officials.

When complaints are made via Membes of Parliament to the Parliamentary Ombudsman regarding the gross misconduct of officials who act for government the public expect that there will be a thorough investigation.
The public would not expect that officials who have access to medical reports and factual information from the public would then give false information to the Ombudsman and then be given first sight of any resulting reports so that they could have any damning coimments removed from the official record before reports are released to the Complainant.
But that is how the system works.

The following was written to the Ombudsman after evidence that had been carefully hidden from the complainant for many years eventually came into his possession.
That evidence included proof of perjury, fraud and perversion of justice.
Not only was the case not re-opened but those who committed the crimes were protected.

Update to the Parliamentary Ombudsman

5th November 2001

OPCA, Millbank Tower
Millbank, London. SW1P 4QP

Dear Mr Comber,

I understand that the Parliamentary Ombudsman is unable to re-open the previous investigation into the Health and Safety Executive No. C724/93 about which Mr W Reid reported on 28th June 1994.
The following statement refers to actions taken by the HSE after that report was issued and is the result of information which came to my attention during the current year, 2001, and it will show that the HSE administration of the entire issue shows a disgraceful contempt of good practice and the law.
I am afraid that it is inevitable that I must make reference to the earlier investigation in the course of this statement because it is clear now that Mr Reid was misled by HSE staff and that I reported just such factual evidence to the Ombudsman's office at the time. In fact all involved were grossly misled by the HSE as the following supported comments will demonstrate all too clearly.


A Senior Lecturer in Health and Safety who was then at the South Bank University in London was in possession of some of the facts of my case in 1992 and 1993 and it was he who advised me to approach the Ombudsman 114. I actually thought until recently that I had been wrongly advised because investigation by the HSE into Agricultural Incidents was as Mr Reid reported, a matter of discretion.
However the main thrust of the HSE's case against me was that they had not been able to proceed with their investigation because they were awaiting a report from Guy's Hospital. This is an entirely false view of their obligations and, as this statement will show, the HSE themselves were very much to blame for the difficulties faced by the then National Poisons Unit at Guy's Hospital. There was no need, as I myself had suggested at the time, for the HSE to wait for confirmation or otherwise of the adverse health effects caused by the incident reported because the HSE is responsible for enforcing Health and Safety and Pesticide Regulations and therefore breaches of those regulations should trigger action whether or not those breaches result in ill-health.
There is no doubt that the HSE themselves were given false information by the employer and the other staff involved but the only official written report in their possession was in my own hand 100,101 and yet not one member of HSE staff ever deemed it necessary to approach me directly to obtain a statement.
Now, almost 10 years after the incident, I am horrified and dismayed both by the information which has come to me in recent months and by the continuing obstructive attitude shown by the HSE 5,10.
That information has been obtained through the Data Protection Act and by the reluctant release of documents prepared by the employer's representatives in a civil action 20-34.
Of particular concern is the fact that the majority of the disgraceful actions taken by the HSE occurred after Mr Reid produced his report.


1. In 1995 there was considerable correspondence in respect to the HSE's refusal to acknowledge the true facts of the case, preferring instead to repeatedly quote their own views on the matter even though they had never seen me or considered the evidence77. Eventually they tried to involve my GP, then Dr Reid, in their deception but he would have none of it having had conversations direct with the NPU and other specialists in the field.
HSE relied on the spurious claims for Coxsackie B 116 about which there are serious irregularities.

2. In November 1995 the HSE held a meeting 67-72b at my home at which Linda Derrick, the EMAS representative Dr Crane and PIAP Chairman Dr Osman attended. Please note those names.
I wondered why they refused to address the questions raised and yet were happy to discuss another case which had just come to light (the Hill case) involving what we then thought was the same poison.
The papers released this year demonstrate that the intention of the meeting was, just as I suspected, to "draw a line" under HSE's involvement in the case 78-79. It was not an effort to establish the true facts as I had been led to believe. All attempts to have the HSE answer the questions prepared for that meeting failed and the HSE staff involved refused to explain the errors in their comments.

3. In full possession of the history of my case, and that of another involving the same employer and HSE area office, Lord Blyth raised questions about the conduct of the HSE in the House of Lords (Hansard, 6 February 1996, pages 186-188) HSE's reply 61-63 was that "an examination of the workplace could reveal little" that the complaint to the Ombudsman "was not upheld" that "there had not been an incident giving rise to significant pesticide exposure" and referred to the consideration of the case by the Pesticide Incidents Appraisal Panel. This is an important factor which you should make note of as the chairman of that panel plays a major part in the entire debacle. The HSE claimed that I had written in 'intemperate terms, among other things suggesting that the Panel is "without integrity" and that HSE "has perverted the course of justice".'
HSE then claimed that they had been forced to close the correspondence, as the cost of continuing it could not be justified. There would have been no need for correspondence had they recognised the facts.
It is clear from the Data released that Dr Osman played a major role in co-ordinating the response to the questions put by Lord Blyth, just as he had prepared answers to complaints put directly to the Director General of HSE on numerous occasions. They claimed to have taken the cases "seriously" and to have "investigated at length" and "been at pains to inform both complainants about the progress and outcome of their cases".
Please note those claims as made by the HSE through Lord Lucas 61-63 on 27th March 1996.

4. You will note my early correspondence with the HSE included reference to "grey imports" 122-123 and other breaches of HSE law with the warning that if the HSE did not act then other people would suffer injury or worse. You may recall that a farmer on the Isle of Wight 46 was fined a considerable sum of money for no less than 11 breaches of Pesticide law. You may not be aware of the facts of that case.
Local people had complained of adverse health effects resulting from those pesticide operations and at least one had been seriously ill in hospital. HSE staff, including Dr Crane, claimed that there was no problem with pesticide use on the farm. Locals eventually called a public meeting but I was unable to attend through ill-health and my wife attended in my place. Linda Derrick represented the HSE at that meeting and she denied that HSE had misled the villagers. My wife said that the HSE had lied and that we had the evidence in our own case. It was not denied. Later Linda Derrick wrote to the local paper 47 in an attempt to belittle my efforts to get to the truth.
Eventually the workers reported their concerns to the supermarkets who forced the HSE to investigate and that is when they found the breaches in regulation which also involved "Grey Imports" and the same chemical supplier as was associated with my own case. Again no adverse health effects were raised or considered and this is ongoing with an investigation throughout this year 2001 - led by Dr Osman - but with so many restrictions on acceptable evidence that it is likely to be simply another wasteful exercise.

5. More importantly there was another issue raised after the Boswell court case involving the illegal burying of cyanide near a water supply to a bottled water plant. It is contrary to regulations to bury cyanide 137-138 but no charges were brought and I was asked to write to the HSE on the matter. Instead of taking the appropriate action HSE took it upon themselves to write to the Environment Agency 43-44 sending them copies of my letters and offering help with dealing with me should I approach them on the matter.

This is hardly in the spirit of HSE's declared policy of "Reducing risks - protecting people" 5,10.

6. According to internal memos released under the Data Protection Act, HSE staff seriously considered taking libel action against both myself 49-52 and another person 48 who was exposing the dire failure of the HSE to act in the best interest of the public on pesticide issues.

7. A senior HSE staff member suggested that attempts be made by an EMAS doctor, Dr Crane, to "spike his guns" 87-88 - sabotage a perfectly legitimate civil action. He appears to have done just that by introducing false evidence and from agency staff who had all worked together to try and undermine the reputation of the only person who had given an honest account of the evidence. Some 90 HSE staff 1-2 colluded together in order to support a false story simply, it seems,118,96 on the say so of one inspector and one EMAS doctor, neither of whom appear to have had a true understanding of pesticide and employment laws.

8. The papers released this year demonstrate that the HSE staff had decided that I was some sort of puppet of the protest groups and that they even wrote my letters for me 84-85. This is mentioned several times in the files and could not be further from the truth. I am not happy with the groups and prefer to work alone as it is only in that way that I can be sure that the facts presented are accurate.
Unfortunately this means that I have little understanding of the correct procedure and this can be a considerable disadvantage when dealing in official circles. However, the truth is all I have.

9. Of considerable concern to me is the fact that the HSE decided that it would be in their interests to influence the diagnosis of the National Poisons Unit and it is clear that they have put pressure on Doctors at the unit 100 who then withdrew their diagnosis of poisoning. From the correspondence so far released, and it is clear that very much has been withheld, the impression is that the HSE were of the opinion that there was no incident 81-83, 96,115 and that therefore it was not possible for me to have been poisoned.
The National Poisons Unit however had already reported that symptoms were consistent with poisoning 109 and so the HSE persuaded them to withdraw that opinion. Unfortunately they refuse to release the correspondence but it is clear from the other paperwork that this is what occurred. The note from Dr J T Carter of HSE 100 illustrates that contact with the NPU 97 which resulted in the withdrawal of the opinion of symptom consistency being written in 1994 by a junior member of the NPU staff who later moved on. As a result Dr Volans at Guy's NPU wrote not one nor two but three letters on the same day about my case 90-94 on the 2nd December 1994. To the DSS he wrote that he confirmed the diagnosis but to my GP he wrote that he withdrew the same diagnosis and to the HSE he wrote explaining what he had done and enclosed a report.

10. HSE seem prepared to mislead our representatives in Parliament. The Countess of Mar wrote to the then Director General, Jenny Bacon, on 7th September 1995 saying in the first paragraph 74 that she had copies of correspondence and it was clear they had mishandled the case. In the third paragraph the Countess mentioned that I had good reason for my actions.
In the internal correspondence from PIAP it would seem that Dr John Osman was given responsibility for the replies and the "background notes" 73 state that "a deliberate decision has been made to avoid being drawn into a discussion with the Countess of Mar of the issues raised in the first or third paragraphs of her letter."
This seems to be the tried and tested means used by HSE in order to avoid the more controversial issues raised by this case and others. HSE is responsible for advice on the Industrial Injury PDC3 but it is clear that they had little knowledge of the Act 53-54 or their responsibilities under it in 1997.

11. Evidence given to Mr Reid suggests that HSE staff kept me informed of the progress of their investigations at all times 103-108. Dr Crane had claimed to have phoned me on numerous occasions but it was not true and when challenged after the 1995 meeting he was unable to provide evidence supporting his false claims. The papers released this year demonstrate that after Mr Senior's visit to the farm HSE had already decided that the false information given by the employer was the truth and that therefore no further action would be taken by HSE 118-119, 125, 115. Typical of the misinformation is the claim that my official report referred to "walking on" a manhole 81 when in fact I wrote "working in" having altered the word "on" to "in" to clarify the point. Another is the false claim that the chemical was "poured down a drain" 95,103
It appears that verbal communications within HSE over-rules the written word. I can see no other explanation.

12. More seriously again in evidence to Mr Reid HSE falsely stated that I had not been asked to empty the sprayer 98 and that I was simply a bystander. This is a gross misrepresentation of the truth and not only have I made legally binding statements to the contrary but fellow workers have admitted what happened before witnesses on numerous occasions. In addition the version of events given to the HSE in the initial stages of their involvement by the employer and his staff 118,119 admit to breaches of pesticide and COSHH regulations and this should automatically have triggered more thorough investigation and would likely have resulted in prosecution of the employer. For example Pesticide Regulations specifically state that excess grain store pesticides should be disposed of by spraying onto the barn walls 137-138 at the time of mixing. Release on the ground and into drains of any type is specifically prohibited and it should never have existed 135-136.
Likewise the COSHH regulations in force at the time 130-134 specifically require that records should be kept and that quantities required, protective clothing and disposal considerations should be recorded before use.
Not only would the chemical not have existed at the time had these rules been followed but I should also have been warned of the dangers and given details on request of the chemicals involved 131-134.
HSE refers throughout to Actellic D, based on my initial report and claims made by the staff. Had HSE properly examined the spray records they would have instantly seen that my version of events 127-128 was the only correct one since far too much chemical had been mixed and the dates between mixing and disposal also confirm breaches of regulation. Worse than that I learnt recently that the chemicals were in fact an illegal mixture 7-11 of two organophosphates Actellic D and Reldan 50. The date of the Williams report is January 1999 but I did not know of it until this year 12-34 when the employer's representatives criticised me for not challenging the false claims made by the scientist in his report. Suspicions I raised 122-123 were correct. 13. HSE admits in papers released this year 57-59 that the true toxic nature of Actellic D alone is unknown. They could not explain the results of my experiments which demonstrated beyond question that, contrary to claims made by HSE and the chemical companies, the chemical retained its toxicity.
All efforts to persuade HSE and their associated bodies to examine this evidence have been met with delays and misleading claims and yet this is a matter of vital importance to the health of the entire population. Furthermore had HSE listened to my concerns and acted sooner it is highly likely that other people now suffering the effects of this toxin would not have been poisoned. The chemicals are soon to be withdrawn.

14. HSE statistics become part of the global information used to determine the safety of pesticides and other chemicals. There is therefore a requirement on HSE that they perform their tasks with accuracy, independence and integrity. I receive reports to this day which suggest that they have learnt nothing from my case other than the increased determination to avoid answering awkward questions so as to avoid criticism.
They continue to repeat that they are simply required to give a "balanced view" within the file. Their obligations under the Data Protection Act to record personal information and details about a data subject accurately and honestly are ignored, 3-6 just as they ignore their obligation to release all documents which mention the data subject. Repeated requests for missing papers such as those relating to Linda Derrick, Mr Reid and the National Poisons Unit and its PIAP members have been ignored.

15. With the new information on the illegal mixture of chemicals, backed by supporting letters from both chemical companies involved and the Pesticide Safety Directorate, 7-9 I approached the HSE and asked them to correct their records and to make efforts to undo the wrongs done to me. They state that this information makes no difference and they also falsely claim that my employer did not have to report the incident 113.
Failure to report is also an offence for which HSE made no attempt to prosecute.
The HSE has a duty to ensure that Health and Safety Regulation is effectively enforced and they were wrong to claim that they required evidence from the NPU before they could act in my case.
There was ample evidence that pesticide, COSHH and employment laws had been breached and it was their duty to recognise the seriousness of the information they were given 120-124, 127-128 and to take note of the recommendation from the Guy's National Poisons Unit 124 that they should instigate a full investigation.
It would appear that HSE staff deliberately gave false and misleading information 98, 103-108 to Mr Reid when he investigated their actions in my case in order that the staff involved escaped criticism.

16. In released correspondence involving HSE and Mr Reid much has been masked e.g 96 indicating the need for me not to see what has been written. However Dr Crane states that "There is simply no evidence of illness" 96 which is plainly untrue and in fact medical records released to date indicate serious ill-health.
When David Eves wrote 103-108 stating the HSE's position to Mr Reid many of his comments were factually incorrect. In the annex at (i) Eves writes that HSE were told that the illness was asthma but this is untrue as they were told that all treatments for what the GPs at first thought was asthma had failed to improve matters and by the time HSE had been given the Official F2508 form all involved knew that poisoning was suspected.
In any event OP poisoning mimics asthma 102, 129 and HSE must have known that was so even though I did not have that knowledge at the time. Also in (ii) it states that I reported the results of an August blood test to HSE but the NPU has never released those results despite repeated requests. It also claims that there was "considerable progress" before October 1992 and that my comments were "not true" but there had been no investigation of the incident or interview with myself - or even a farm visit 77, 78 until after I wrote to the Director General in order that he was made aware of the failings at Basingstoke. HSE policy was reported 104 as stating that all pesticide incidents are taken seriously, that they should protect the health of human beings and safeguard the environment, and yet they failed to mention the COSHH regulations and the obvious breaches that were admitted. All protests that no action had been taken appear to have been taken as comments rather than as complaints. They even ignored advice that they should investigate given by the NPU 124 but when Mr Reid issued his report I had decided to give up pressing HSE for action and that would have remained the case had they not then tried to interfere with my civil case.
The failure to proceed was blamed on Dr Murray and the NPU and yet she was a member of PIAP which itself is described by Mr Reid as "an integral part of HSE".98 It is one thing not to investigate but it is an entirely different matter to promote false information as factual with the intent to discredit sick people.


17. The first and most obvious result of the maladministration is that the wrong signal was sent to those who willingly breach pesticide law. HSE have shown, and continue to show, that they are all too willing to accept the word of employers instead of properly investigating and acting to enforce the law 46,48.
There have been many serious examples of this process at work since 1992 and in some cases deaths have resulted and yet the same staff are given the task of determining links with exposures.
Dr Osman, Linda Derrick and the then EMAS staff member Dr Crane, were all involved in the Boswell fiasco and yet Dr Osman has been given the task of overseeing the epidemiological study into those same incidents.

18. I understand that if the HSE and PIAP do not recognise poisoning incidents then they are not reported to the manufacturers of the toxin. Failing to properly evaluate incidents therefore removes a vital safety net in the post marketing surveillance of pesticides. The failure of the HSE to act responsibly in my case and others has endangered the public and resulted in more human health problems resulting from the same chemicals since 1992.
Dr Osman once wrote that PIAP did not "have to be right" in individual cases.
All cases are individual.

19. International data on pesticide safety has also been corrupted and this poses similar risks.

20. In my own case the actions of the HSE resulted in exactly what they intended to achieve.
They had the diagnosis of poisoning withdrawn on false grounds.Claims of viral cause are extremely dubious 116,117. Without the backing of the poisons unit it has been a long fight to obtain even rudimentary medical testing and treatment. In fact the HSE opinion that my imagination was to blame became a diagnosis of somatisation syndrome in the minds of certain members of the medical profession who express paranoid feelings and are fearful of giving a diagnosis of poisoning lest they are castigated by their colleagues.

21. Without the supporting diagnosis of the specialists at the National Poisons Unit I have also been denied my rightful benefits from the Department of Social Security 35,55-56. This inevitably has resulted in my appearance before tribunals and even the Courts in my efforts to overturn the false evidence placed before them by the HSE and their co-conspirators. The loss of income and the strain on myself and my family has been considerable - as has the cost in maintaining the struggle for justice. Evidence of ill health is obvious. 35,42,60,60b,64-66,89,93-94,99 and the mass of information so far released in the medical records.

22. The suggestion that HSE should prevent the success of the court case was almost fulfilled when Dr Crane wrote in January 1995 to the employer and my own legal representatives proclaiming that there had been no incident.
He had not realised that my GP had obtained a second opinion and had the backing of the Area Health Authority on the treatment he had chosen for chronic OP poisoning.

23. The actions of the HSE have also resulted in the widespread reporting that I was an unreliable witness and their attempts to blacken my name unusually reached the level of the House of Lords 61-63 in addition to adverse comments made in the local press 46,47 about the comments I had made on behalf of the many victims of the misguided approach of HSE staff 45.

24. The struggle has been a considerable drain on my finances to the point where there is now no chance of legal redress for the disgraceful treatment meted out by staff at all levels in the HSE.

25. It has been almost impossible to obtain straight and accurate answers from HSE. 36-41,75-76,80


The HSE must never be permitted to act in this way ever again. Several people have reported similar approaches by the HSE to their workplace incidents since 1992 and it seems that this represents policy rather than a single incident when things went dreadfully wrong.
Some of those involved have since left the HSE, no doubt with lucrative pensions and good references.
Others appear to have been promoted which again indicates policy decisions. All should face disciplinary action at the highest level. Those who have deliberately misled the Ombudsman and Parliament should be made to explain themselves to a select committee.
At the very least I believe that the false information which pervades throughout the files on my case should be removed and written apologies given.
Furthermore I believe that the HSE should make every effort to undo the harm caused at the same levels as they caused that harm. This would include the House of Lords and the Medical and Scientific professions and will also involve the DSS and the legal system.
It is interesting that the Health Service Ombudsman was very critical of all those involved at the Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Trust but he was powerless to enforce his decision and the Trust continues to avoid addressing the serious issues raised. The problems with the staff at the Trust would not have occurred had the HSE acted in accordance with their duties and within the law. The GMC have so far been unable to confirm or deny that the Trust is enacting a clause under the rules of disclosure of medical records which allow them to withhold records if criminal charges might follow.
The HSE staff are responsible for this unsatisfactory situation and they should act to release the Trust from the situation in which it finds itself so that we can clear the muddy waters once and for all.

I do not believe that any actions less than suggested will satisfactorily conclude this disgraceful episode in the history of the Civil Service and I hope that the Ombudsman will see fit to support my complaint at the highest level so that others will not suffer as I and my family have done over the last 10 years.


1-2. Names of HSE personnel involved in this case taken from Data Protection Documents.
3. Bruce to Yeo HSE Basingstoke re.illegal acts and requirement of HSE to enforce the regulations 13/08/2001
4. Bruce to Walker DG HSE re. HSE failure to address the issues and results of actions 06/08/2001
5. Walker DG HSE to Bruce closing correspondence 02/08/2001
6. Bruce to Walker DG HSE re. failure of HSE to discover basic facts and action against victim 18/07/2001
7. Dow Agrosciences confirming withdrawal of Reldan 100 and no recommendation for mixing 12/07/2001
8-9 Birch PSD to Bruce confirming illegal mixture and NO recommendations for mixing 11/07/2001
10. Yeo HSE Basingstoke to Bruce Incident "not reportable" correspondence closed 27/07/2001
11. Syngenta to Bruce confirming no approvals for mixing and no knowledge of mix toxicity 03/07/2001
12-19 Bruce to Gabb & Co with information refuting claims made in the Williams report 26/06/2001
20-34 The incredibly inaccurate Williams Report on the chemical mixture received 23/6/2001 12/01/2001
35. Part of Commissioner Henty's Report on Hearing for PDC3 claim 22.02.2001 rec. 09/04/2001
36. Bruce to Calaghan, Chairman HSE Commission re. unlawful actions by HSE staff 22/03/2001
37. Bruce to Williams HSE Basingstoke re Cymag regulations and HSE "investigations" 09/05/2001
38. Bruce to Williams " " raising questions re pesticides and chemical safety 18/04/2001
39-41 Bruce to Corbin FSA enclosing copy of Bruce to McDonald PSD 9/4/01 for answers 09/04/2001
42. Bingham IoW health authority to Bruce re. continued funding for treatment for poisoning 10/07/2000
43. Fax Gilby HSE to Prendergast Environment Agency offering help to deal with Bruce 18/10/1999
44. Gilby HSE Basingstoke to Bruce suggesting contact with Environment Agency 18/10/1999
45. Doig to Lee HSE re persistent lobbyist and believes that he and wife ill due to exposures 23/06/1999
46. IoW County Press cutting re. Tesco ban on Boswell products 23/04/1999
47. IoW County Press Cuttings re. HSE attempts to discredit Bruce 20&22/02/1998
48. Bouckley re Miles Clarke memo re proposed action for libel 08/01/1998
49-52 Memos Osman and Law re claims of libel in Bruce letter of 10/12/1997 dated 05/01/98 and 23/12/1997
53-54 Griffiths to VMD and Rawbone demonstrating HSE ignorance of the Industrial Disease Act 23/04/1997
55-56 Bruce to Osman PIAP with details of PDC3 industrial Disease - he dismisses it as for DSS 07/07/1997
57-59 Godden PRS to Osman demonstrating lack of basic knowledge of pesticide properties 13/02/1997
60. Kenyon to Bruce confirming symptoms, diagnosis and treatment of chronic OP poisoning 30/04/1996
60b Unanimous decision of 1997 Tribunal neurological symptoms "clear from the outset" 13/06/1997
61-63 Lucas to Lord Blyth prepared by HSE as answer to questions in House of Lords 27/03/1996
64-66 Sick Notes - legally binding - for OP poisoning by Dr Reid, Dr Walker and Dr White 5/10/95 - 04/09/1996
67-72b List of questions (unanswered) and chronology of events prepared for HSE meeting 03/11/1995
73-74 HSE deliberate decision to avoid responding to Countess Mar's raised issues 07/09/1995
75-76 Foster to Osman and deliberate decision to avoid responding to issues raised by Bruce21/7/95 28/07/1995
77. Hyland to Osman - more misinformation from Scott and Crane and wanting solicitor present 17/07/1995
78-79 Scott to Hyland "if we ignore" doctors PIAP in the clear. Draw a line under HSE involvement 14/07/1995
80. Bruce to DG with questions and marked list of HSE groups responsible 03/07/1995
81. A Scott hand written notes show false information accepted, "elephantine memory"- or records undated 1995
82-83 Bateman PIAP to Osman PIAP again false information accepted - no incident = no poisoning 07/02/1995
84 Rimington DG HSE desk notes "in the hands of the protest groups who ..write his letters for him" 27/06/1995
85 Note PJC Scott? HSE to Newble & Yeo HSE "latest ..drafted by another hand I'd say PEGS?" 07/04/1995
86 Marrs PIAP to Osman PIAP "hope he doesn't get on to me but if he does I will let you know" 27/06/1995
87-88 Indication of conspiracy to stop a civil action notes on copy Farmers Weekly report of writ 09/12/1994
89 Volans Guy's NPU to DSS confirmation of eligibility for Industrial Disease PDC3 06/12/1994
90-94 Volans to Carter HSE, Volans to Reid withdrawing and Volans to Warren DSS confirming on 02/12/1994
95 Fax Dockrey to Crane with Crane's comments added. Complete Bruce files are numerous... 20/09/1994
96 Crane EMAS to Carter HSE Comments masked out save "simply no evidence of illness" 21/07/1994
97 Osman to Carter suggesting putting pressure on Murray at the NPU 11/07/1994
98 Reid Ombudsman to Rimington DG demonstrating how he had been misled by HSE 28/06/1994
99 Chia NPU to Reid GP suggesting more tests for OP exposed people like Bruce 01/06/1994
100 Internal notes indicating the intention by Carter HSE to put pressure on Murray at NPU 10/05/1994
101 Scott to Platt-Yeo confirming that the employer did not report the incident as required by law 21/03/1994
102 Lancet paper confirming known links between OP exposures and persistent asthma 17/12/1994
103-108 Eves HSE to Reid Ombudsman with inaccurate and misleading information 24/12/1993
109 Chia to Reid GP confirming symptom consistency and raising false information re. virus 22/12/1993
110-113 HSE's own MS17 paper on OP poisoning received by Bruce from book shop on the 10/12/1993
114 Dalton Senior lecturer in HSE to Bruce encouraging complaint to Ombudsman and legal action 03/08/1993
115 HSE Record of complaint indicating that complaint was "cleared" ENDED? NO RISK? on 02/09/1992
116 Test "results" Serious doubts exist over the claims for Coxsackie B virus see 177 & sample date 19/07/1993
117 Tests performed in the first week at Guy's. Later dates & results of tests incorrectly reported 19/07/1993
118 Senior file note demonstrating the false information he was given and no statement taken March 1993
119 Senior report on visit showing no COSHH report and that he had seen records of pesticides! March 1993
He did not visit in respect of the incident but it was a general examination of the organisation.
He missed the illegal mix - despite having been told, and admitting to seeing that records were kept.
120 Bruce to Senior mentioning other safety concerns and incidents on the farm & sprayer evidence 18/02/1993
121 Bruce to Senior re no advice or help in 7 months save the photocopies and consent forms etc 10/02/1993
122-123 Bruce to Senior re. no COSHH, false claims over delays, symptoms, "Grey imports"/mixes 02/02/1993
124 Bruce to Senior. Re giving F2508 completed to employer on 18/8/92 24/09/1992
Passed on the toxicologist's request for an HSE investigation
125 Senior report of contacts with farm claiming that employer did not know of OP link on 25/8/92 26/08/1992
Also falsely claimed Bruce had not had any contact with pesticides or work situation since the illness.
Also that there was no awareness from the current employer of OP poisoning - obviously untrue.
126 Note accompanying new F2508 forms passed to the employer with request for its completion 17/08/1992
The employer failed to do so - another offence.
127-128 Bruce to Senior with photocopy of the completed F2508 form as given to employer 21/08/1992
Senior had said that Bruce could face prosecution had he not reported it. His employer did not.
Mentioned the confusing information given in respect to poisoning symptoms.
NOTE. The account of the incident mentions "work in" the manhole - NOT "walking on" as claimed by HSE
129 Manifestations of OP poisoning, US Environmental Protection Agency- symptoms underlined rec.18/07/1992
HSE dismissed this information as PEGS propaganda.
Before this date all involved were uncertain as to the symptoms which could be expected
as the result of OP exposure. Hence the delay in reporting to HSE.
130 ADAS "Progress" publication issued to as advice to all farmers on compliance with COSHH October 1990
131-134 British Agrochemicals Association Guide to COSHH issued in the late 1980s Undated
Details the regulations which were flagrantly breached and which resulted in the incident and exposure
135-136 Guidelines for applying Crop protection chemicals issued by MAFF January 1983
Advice on safe disposal and that sprayers should be emptied IMMEDIATELY after use
137-138 Guidelines for the disposal of unwanted pesticides and containers on farms and holdings MAFF 1980
States the specific rules applicable for grain store pesticides and cyanide.
Excess Grain store pesticides should be sprayed on to barn walls not disposed of on the ground or in drains.
The area chosen should not risk run-off into drains and should not be accessible to people or animals
Cyanide should not be buried and empty containers should be disposed of in specific ways

Apologies for the odd papers out of order but this has taken over a week to prepare and the whole paper would require re-referencing because of those mistakes!
I might even make things worse!
I am sure that you will understand.

Despite providing evidence of perversion of justice and serious misconduct by officials the Ombudsmasn refused to re-open the case or to report the crimes to those responsible for enforcing the law.
Effectively "they got away with it" and yet even the UK Prime Minister repeatedly says that

"No one is above the law"

Dated 05/11/01 - Uploaded to website 04/03/2015

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